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Abstract 
Successive debt crises that have affected Latin America since the late 1970s 
had unique and substantial consequences on women in the areas of, 
education, health, as well as political and economic participation that 
exacerbated gender inequalities. During this period, demand increased for 
social programmes that had the potential to mitigate decreases in women’s 
welfare. National policy responses to the crises were, however, largely driven 
by International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditional lending agreements. 
Though conditionality was primarily motivated by conditionality fiscal 
austerity, liberalization, deregulation, and privatization, conditions 
pertaining to redistribution and social policy also existed. This dissertation 
has two main aims: the first is to determine what effects conditions in 
different issue areas had on the prevalence of social programmes in Latin 
America in the late 20th and early 21st centuries and the second is to 
understand how changes to social programmes have affected women’s 
welfare in relation to the welfare of men.  
 
Building off Kentikelenis et al.’s categorisation of different conditionality 
issue areas,1 the first analysis makes use of instrumental variable two-stage 
last-squared (IV 2SLS) estimation to understand the relationship between 
specific conditions and social programmes. Next, fixed-effects (FE) estimation 
was leveraged in order to examine the impact of various social programmes 
on women’s welfare. The findings conclude that while conditionality had 
mixed effects on social programmes, it diminished those which were 




1 Kentikelenis, Alexander, Thomas Stubbs, and Lawrence King. “2020 IMF Monitor - 
Conditionality Data.” IMF Monitor, 2016b. 
 
1. Introduction 
The 1970s reflected a period of low interest rates and borrowing-led development 
initiatives in Latin American countries. However, shortly after, in the late 1970s 
and 1980s, increased interest rates, a decline in commodity prices, capital flight, 
and panicked creditors ultimately culminated into the Latin American sovereign 
debt crisis. This sparked decades of successive debt and other financial crises,2,3  
the worst of which was experienced in the 1980s, during the so-called ‘lost 
decade’.4 To help ease financial burdens and the consequences of the crises, Latin 
American governments turned to the IMF for funding. In response, the IMF 
offered lending arrangements conditional on policy changes within borrowing 
countries, which became increasingly dedicated to reforming the underlying 
socioeconomic structures of borrowing countries. In this way the IMF became 
central to the policy reactions of countries in crisis and, in turn, the gendered 
consequences of the policy reactions. 
 
Policies based on conditional lending agreements were implemented in situations 
where underlying socioeconomic structures were inherently gendered and 
constrained women in unique ways. During periods of crisis, increased financial 
burdens can result in households rationing resources for education and 
healthcare.5 Women tend to already occupy roles considered of lesser economic 
value in the labour market, which worsen in value during financial crises; roles 
predominantly held by women, and that women are often considered more 
suitable for, tend to reflect undervalued and often unpaid responsibilities and 
unpaid labour reduces women’s ability to work in more time-demanding or less 
 
2 Financial crises include sovereign debt crises but also inflation crises, currency crashes and 
banking crises (Footnote 3). 
3 Reinhart, Carmen M., and Kenneth S. Rogoff. This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of 
Financial Folly. First paperback print. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, (2011): 1-512. 
4 Shadlen, Ken, “Debt, finance and the IMF: three decades of debt crises in Latin America,” in 
South America, Central America and the Caribbean 2004. Regional surveys of the world (12th), 8-
12. London, UK: Routledge, 2005. 
5 Blanton, Robert, Shannon Blanton, and Dursun Peksen, “The Gendered Consequences of 
Financial Crises: A Cross-National Analysis.” Politics & Gender 15, no. 4 (2019): 942. 
 
flexible roles.6,7 Furthermore, male political candidates are preferred during 
financial crisis and recovery.8 Policies that do not challenge the structures of 
constraint will be less likely to ease the various burdens women bear and can 
even exacerbate gendered issues.  
 
IMF conditionality in the late 20th and early 21st centuries was largely directed 
toward the goals of stabilisation or austerity, privatisation, deregulation, as well 
as trade and financial liberalisation,9 each with their own gendered 
consequences. Deregulation can proliferate vulnerable employment conditions 
that predominantly effect female labourers.10 And, though trade liberalisation 
can create new employment opportunities for women, such as in Global Value 
Chains (GVCs), they can also produce new forms of exploitation that especially 
affect women.11,12,13,14 These mechanisms can exacerbate gender inequalities and 
increase women’s demand for social programmes, which are important tools to 
counter the negative, and highly gendered, effects of financial crises. However, a 
move from public universal to private contributory-based social support based on 
the goals of austerity and privatisation could limit women’s access to said 
programmes and in turn exacerbate the issues women face during financial 
crises. That is because women’s disadvantaged position in the labour force on 
 
6 Rubery, Jill. “From ‘Women and Recession’ to ‘Women and Austerity.’” In Women and Austerity: 
The Economic Crisis and the Future for Gender Equality. Routledge IAFFE Advances in Feminist 
Economics 11. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2013: 18. 
7 Gammarano, Rosina. “Paid Employment vs Vulnerable Employment: A Brief Study of 
Employment Patterns by Status in Employment.” ILO STAT, 2018: 1-8. 
8 Blanton, Blanton, Peksen, “Gendered Consequences”, 941-70. 
9 Summers, Lawrence H & Pritchett, Lant H, 1993. "The Structural-Adjustment Debate," 
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2): 383. 
10 Chen, Martha Alter, and Rachel Moussié. “The IMF, Gender Equality and Labour.” Bretton 
Woods Project, 2017. 
11 Folbre, Nancy. 1994. “Chapter 1: Feminist theory and political economy” and “Chapter 2:  
Collective action and structures of constraint” in Who pays for the kids: gender and the 
structures of constraint, 15-81, Routledge: London. 
12 Zohir, Salma .C. and Pratima Paul-Majumder. 1996. “Garment workers in Bangladesh: 
Economic, social and health conditions.” Research monograph (Bangladesh Institute of 
Development Studies), no. 18. 
13 Elson, Diane. 1999. “Labour markets as Gendered Institutions: Equality, Efficiency and 
Empowerment Issues.” World Development 27, no. 3: 611-627.  
14 Wright, Melissa W. 2006. Disposable Women and Other Myths of Global Capitalism. New York: 
Routledge. 
 
average limits both their economic attainment and access to non-vulnerable 
work that offers social support.  
 
This dissertation investigates the hypothesized relationship pathway from IMF 
conditionality, to public social programmes, to women’s welfare in relation to 
that of men in the context of Latin America from the late 20th to the early 21st 
century. The gendered implications of IMF conditional lending agreements 
constitute an understudied subject. Though strong links have been established 
by feminist economists, an analysis of which conditional categories have 
impacted women and how is still lacking. Yet, conditional lending programmes 
based on similar aims are still leveraged by the Bretton Woods institutions.15  
 
To do so, I have divided this dissertation into two separate analyses, each 
addressing its own research question. The first research question, Research 
Question 1, broadly asks: what is the effect of IMF conditionality on public social 
programmes in Latin American countries affected by sovereign debt crises? 
Studies of conditionality have thus far examined the impact of participation in 
IMF conditional lending agreements, and how the overall number of conditions 
effects various outcomes, such as democracy, health, and inequality.16,17,18 Using 
IV estimation, this dissertation will instead analyse the effects of conditionality 
in different issue areas on various categories of social programming, 
understanding that conditions of different policy concerns are likely to have very 
different impacts. I draw heavily on the categorisation of issue areas by 
Kentikelenis, Stubbs, and King.19 The second research question, Research 
 
15 Gill, Stephen, and Adrienne Roberts. “Macroeconomic Governance, Gender Inequality, and 
Global Crises.” In Questioning Financial Governance from a Feminist Perspective, 155–72. 
Florence: Taylor & Francis Group, 2011. 
16 Nelson, Stephen C., and Geoffrey P. R. Wallace. “Are IMF Lending Programs Good or Bad for 
Democracy?” The Review of International Organizations 12, no. 4 (2016): 523–58. 
17 Stubbs, Thomas, Alexander Kentikelenis, David Stuckler, Martin McKee, and Lawrence King. 
“The IMF and Government Health Expenditure: A Response to Sanjeev Gupta.” Social Science & 
Medicine 181 (2017): 202–4. 
18 Lang, Valentin. “The Economics of the Democratic Deficit: The Effect of IMF Programs on 
Inequality.” The Review of International Organizations 16, no. 3 (2020): 599–623. 
19 Kentikelenis, Alexander, Thomas Stubbs, and Lawrence King. “2020 IMF Monitor - 
Conditionality Data.” IMF Monitor, 2016b. 
 
Question 2, asks: how do changes to social programmes affect women’s welfare in 
relation to men’s welfare in Latin American countries affected by sovereign debt 
crises? I leverage fixed effects (FE) modelling to understand the second 
relationship.    
 
 
2. Background and literature 
2.1. The Gendered Effects of Financial Crises. 
The ramifications of debt crises in the late 20th and early 21st centuries have not 
been gender-neutral. Women were disproportionately burdened by the long-term 
costs,20 which in turn had effects on gender inequalities during and following the 
debt crises, effects that were especially felt by economically and racially 
disadvantaged women. This was largely due to the concept of ‘structures of 
constraint’,21,22,23 which affect the ability of women to attain freedoms and 
empowerment. Constraints can be both informal or formal and the two categories 
can impact one another. The former can be understood as “norms, beliefs and 
values that form the ‘intrinsically gendered’ institutions of family, kinship and 
community”.24 Formal constraints are more impersonal and institutional; they 
are “reproduced and reinforced within the public domains of states, markets and 
civil society.”25 This study will primarily focus on the ways in which formal 
constraints are impacted by social policy and what effect these impacts have on 
women, though informal constraints also play a role by determining the strength 
of the impact that removing formal constraints can have on women’s welfare. 
This point will be revisited in the Discussion (6.2.2).  
 
20 Floro, Maria, Annika Tornqvist, and Emcet Oktay Tas. “The Impact of the Economic Crisis on 
Women’s Empowerment.” Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) Working Paper 
Series, 2009, 1–59. 
21 Folbre, “Chapter 1”, 15-81. 
22 Kabeer, Naila, Simeen Mahmud, and Sakiba Tasneem. 2011. “Does Paid Work Provide a  
Pathway to Women’s Empowerment? Empirical Findings from Bangladesh.” IDS Working Paper 
2011, no. 375: 1-42.  
23 Kabeer, Naila. 2018. Gender, livelihood capabilities and women’s economic empowerment:  
reviewing evidence over the life course. London: Gender and Adolescence: Global Evidence 
(GAGE).  
24 Whitehead 1979 as cited in Ibid, 2. 
25 Ibid., 4. 
 
Financial crises precipitate changes in the labour market that often exacerbate 
gender inequalities. Women are “differently positioned in the job structure”.26  
 
The naturalisation or ‘sex-typing’ of less economically valued roles reflects an 
informal constraint that clusters women into such positions.27  Women’s paid 
work is often undervalued because it reflects their unpaid reproductive labour.28 
The implications of this can have lasting impacts even beyond periods of 
financial crisis because employers who benefit from women’s lower-paying, 
precarious, or ‘reserve labour’ positions in the labour force  may be incentivised 
to maintain such systems.29 This subsequently contributes to women making up 
a high percentage of vulnerable labour.30,31  
 
To compensate for personal or familial economic loss due to national financial 
crises, women’s participation in education can be expected to deteriorate, as will 
their “access to health and other social support services”.32 Reduced household 
incomes coupled with reduced public spending on education programmes can 
lead to the ‘rationing’ of household expenditures that tends to hurt women and 
girls most.33 This is impacted by structures of constraint faced by women and 
impacts the further reproduction of constraints. Women’s lower average income 
potential, a result of structural constraints, makes investing in their education 
and health a lower pay-off for families deciding between sending boys/men or 
girls/women to school or seeking healthcare for boys/men or girls/women. In the 
opposite direction, removing girls and women from school and limiting their 
health inhibits their socioeconomic prospects.  
 
 
26 Rubery “Women and Austerity”, 18. 
27 Ibid., 13. 
28Samman, Emma and Joan Lombardi. 2019. Childcare and Working Families: New Opportunity 
or Missing Link? An evidence brief. UNICEF. 
29 Rubery “Women and Austerity”, 18. 
30 Gammarano, “Vulnerable Employment”, 1-8. 
31 Blanton et al., “Gendered Consequences”, 941-70. 
32 Floro, Dymski, “Economic Crises on Women’s Empowerment”, 1269-83. 
33 Blanton et al., “Gendered Consequences”, 941-70. 
 
Financial crises can also have indirect impacts on both the supply and demand of 
female political representation. Given that female political candidates are more 
likely to be “educated women […] and professionals in their mid-thirties 
onward,”34 the gendered economic, educational, and to some extent, health 
consequences of crises can reduce the supply of female politicians. Informal 
constraints, wherein women are less likely to be “supported in dealing with 
issues that are viewed as ‘salient’,” such as financial crisis and recovery, also 
inhibit women’s ability to take on policy-making roles.35 Women’s participation 
in such roles, though, has the potential to reduce gender imbalances in various 
spheres of society, such as in politics and the economy.36,37,38  
 
Social protection programmes have the potential to reduce various types of 
gender inequalities and can therefore be expected to have an even more 
impactful role during crises, when consequences to women’s welfare are 
heightened.39  
 
2.2. Gender and Welfare Systems in Latin America 
In order to understand what impact potential changes to social programmes can 
have on women, the relationship between social programmes and women’s 
welfare must first be understood. Present-day social welfare institutions 
developed from Spanish and Portuguese colonial regimes that were highly 
unequal from the perspectives of class, race, and gender, which is often an 
omitted area of analysis in mainstream scholarship.40,41 The welfare system 
developed based primarily on occupations that were greatly associated with 
 
34 IPU 2000: 96–97 as cited in Ibid., 946. 
35 Ibid., 946. 
36 Detraz, Nicole, and Dursun Peksen. “‘Women Friendly’ Spending? Welfare Spending and 
Women’s Participation in the Economy and Politics.” Politics & Gender 14, no. 2 (2018): 137–61. 
37 Hedman, Linn. “Female Political Representation and Social Spending,” 2018. 
38 Prihatini, E. S. “Women’s Representation and Government Welfare Spending in Indonesia 
1970—2020.” IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental Science 729, no. 1 (2020). 
39 Floro, Dymski, “Economic Crises on Women’s Empowerment”, 1269-83 
40 Mesa-Lago, Carmelo. 1989.Ascent to Bankruptcy: Financing Social Security in Latin America.  
Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
41 Segura-Ubiergo, Alex. The Political Economy of the Welfare State in Latin America: 
Globalization, Democracy, and Development (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), 26. 
 
racial divisions from the colonial era.42 It “extended to the best organized and 
strategically located sectors of the middle and working classes […] and only later 
for larger sectors of the working class”.43 When one considers that women are, 
and have historically been, over-represented in the lower-end of labour 
hierarchies (in terms of economic value and precarity), it becomes clearer as to 
why gender inequalities in labour systems have contributed to the gendered 
nature of social welfare systems.  
 
A strand of feminist studies of welfare states has also argued that social systems 
have maintained traditional gender and family structures, further 
circumscribing the roles of women to wives and mothers.44,45 These scholars 
maintain that welfare systems are separate for men and women and reproduce 
social roles; one based on employment (formerly military contributions) and 
another that consists of means-tested, family-related social programmes.46 One 
can see that there is an inherent division based on independence and 
dependence.47,48,49,50 In addition, patriarchal family proscriptions exclude female-
led households from the same benefits as male-led households.51,52  
 
However, these arguments do not take into account the important role that 
social protection systems have had on women’s welfare and the fact that social 
 
42 Huber 1996 as cited in Ibid.  
43 Huber, Evelyne. 1996. “Options for Social Policy in Latin America: Neoliberal versus Social  
Democratic Models,” in Gøsta Esping-Andersen, ed., Welfare States in Transition: National 
Adaptations in Global Economies, London: Sage Publications, 147. 
44 Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton, N.J: Princeton  
University Press, 1990: 1-248. 
45 Bussemaker, Jet, and Kees van Kersbergen. "Contemporary Social‐Capitalist Welfare States 
and Gender Inequality." In Gender and Welfare State Regimes, by Sainsbury, Diane, ed., edited 
by Diane Sainsbury. Oxford: Oxford Scholarship Online, 2003. 
46 Orloff, Ann. “Gender in the Welfare State.” Annual Review of Sociology 22, no. 1 (1996): 51–78. 
47 Pateman, Carole. "The patriarchal welfare state." The welfare state reader 2 (1988): 134-150. 
48 Lister, Ruth. "Women, economic dependency and citizenship." Journal of Social Policy 19, no. 4 
(1990): 445-467. 
49 Fraser, Nancy, and Linda Gordon. "“Dependency” demystified: inscriptions of power in a  
keyword of the welfare state." Social politics: International studies in gender, state & society 1, 
no. 1 (1994): 4-31. 
50 Orloff, “Gender in the Welfare State”, 51-78. 
51 Elson, Diane. The impact of structural adjustment on women: concepts and issues. No. 1659-
2016-136133. 1988. 
52 Kabeer, “Gender and Empowerment”.  
 
systems can be transformed. For example, in a large study of 97 national social 
systems, Detraz and Peksen found that an increase in social spending positively 
impacted women’s economic and political empowerment.53 Raphael and Bryant 
similarly found that social determinants of women’s health were positively 
affected by public social spending and negatively affected where welfare states 
became increasingly market-oriented.54 
 
A move toward universal social systems based on citizenship, rather than 
targeted by occupation, would likely benefit women more and have been 
recommended by the Gender Equality Observatory for Latin America and the 
Caribbean.55 This is because the unpaid work that women do, though it 
contributes significantly to the development of countries, is largely discounted in 
contributory social welfare systems. Though studies of pension privatisations in 
Latin America during the 1980s that were commissioned by the World Bank 
suggested little impact was felt by women in their old age, their studies only 
measured changes to consumption patterns of “ideal-type” women and concluded 
that interfamily transfers mitigated negative effects.56 This of course fails to take 
into account a representative outlook of women and ignores the fact that women 
lose personal rights and become dependent on family support.57,58 This 
dissertation builds-off of Dion’s view that private, market-oriented social 
protection systems are likely to reinforce gender inequities as long as women 
hold lower roles in the labour hierarchy.59  
 
53 Detraz, Peksen, “Women Friendly’ Spending?”, 137-61. 
54 Raphael, Dennis, and Toba Bryant. “The Welfare State as a Determinant of Women’s Health:  
Support for Women’s Quality of Life in Canada and Four Comparison Nations.” Health Policy 68, 
no. 1 (2004): 63–79. 
55 Gender Equality Observatory for, Latin America and the Caribbean, Vereinte Nationen, and 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). From Beneficiaries to 
Citizens Access by and Treatment of Women in Latin American Pension Systems, 2019, 1-76. 
56 Parker and Wong 2001; James et al. 2003 as cited in Dion, M. “Women’s Welfare and Social 
Security Privatization in Mexico.” Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & 
Society 13, no. 3 (2006): 400–26. 
57 De Mesa, Alberto Arenas, and Veronica Montecinos. "The Privatization of Social Security and 
Women's Welfare: Gender Effects of the Chilean Reform." Latin American Research Review 34, no. 3 
(1999): 7-37. 
58 Dion, “Women’s Welfare”, 400-26. 
59 Ibid., 421. 
 
One might ask why changes to social programmes during debt crises are in 
favour of privatisation given the ramifications on women’s welfare. In part, these 
policies reflect the goals of conditions in IMF lending agreements.  
 
2.3. Financial Crises and IMF Conditionality 
The IMF, as a lender of last resort, became the option that many Latin American 
countries turned to in the late 20th century. The situation presented itself as a 
new opportunity for the IMF to become deeply involved in the ways in which 
fiscal balance was to be achieved. In response to the rise of new economic 
ideologies as well as political pressures from major stakeholders and donor 
governments, the IMF began to attach ‘structural’ conditions to their lending 
agreements that centred around the restructuring of underlying economies and 
societies and afforded governments less policy space to achieve their quantitative 
targets.60 IMF conditionality, which initially had the aim of “reducing excess 
demand by cutting fiscal deficits and restricting the growth of the money 
supply”, had ‘crept’ into much more imposing areas, such as “the privatization of 
public enterprises, trade liberalization, the reform of banking and bankruptcy 
legislation, anti-poverty measures, and the prevention of money-laundering and 
terrorist financing” by the 1980s.61 IMF loan programmes came in the form of 
comprehensive structural adjustment policy packages that were directed toward 
four main pillars of stabilization (or austerity), liberalization, deregulation, and 
privatization.62  
 
However, it is important to note that conditional IMF programmes were not 
solely motivated by these four goals. Increasingly as of the late 1990s, 
programmes have included conditions for poverty reduction strategies and the 
strengthening of social safety nets. The IMF has even claimed that “under IMF-
 
60 Kentikelenis, Alexander E., Thomas H. Stubbs, and Lawrence P. King. “IMF Conditionality 
and Development Policy Space, 1985–2014.” Review of International Political Economy 23, no. 4 
(2016a): 543–82. 
61 Babb, Sarah, and Ariel Buira. “Mission Creep, Mission Push and Discretion : The Case of IMF  
Conditionality.” In The IMF and the World Bank at Sixty, 59–83. London, UK: Anthem Press, 
2005: 2. 
62 Summers, Pritchett, "The Structural-Adjustment Debate," 383. 
 
supported programs, the Fund helps governments to protect and even increase 
social spending”.63,64,65 Nevertheless, research by Kentikelenis et al. has found 
that data did not support this statement.66 They found that social policy 
conditions featured highly targeted programmes with “overly stringent or out-
dated eligibility criteria,” as opposed to universally applied social programmes 
that are an objective of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG).67  
 
Given that conditional lending programmes consist of conditions in vastly 
different policy areas, it is likely that there will be different policy outcomes 
(Rickard and Caraway 2018 as cited in Foster et al. 2019).  
 
2.4. The Gendered Impact of Conditionality 
IMF conditions of austerity and privatisation rest on the underlying assumption 
that basic needs will be met through work benefits, income earned, and 
household arrangements.68,69 This, however, fails to consider both the lack of 
social support offered to women by the labour market as well as household 
hierarchies that often exist and translate to an unequal division of goods.70,71,72 
Austerity policies also contract public sector employment, that predominantly 
employs women and decrease the real value of minimum wages, affecting low 
 
63 IMF 2015 as cited in Kentikelenis, Stubbs, King, “IMF Conditionality”, 564. 
64  The IMFs social policy primarily surrounds “Social safety nets and their financing; aging 
populations and the fiscal consequences of publicly mandated pensions and health insurance 
schemes; and reform of price subsidies, particularly food and fuel/energy subsidies.” (Footnote 
62). 
65 IEO, IMF. “The IMF and Social Protection: Draft Issues Paper for an Evaluation by The 
Independent Evaluation Office (IEO).” The Independent Evaluation Office of the IMF (IEO), 
2016: 3. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Economou et al. 2014a; 2014b; Kentikelenis 2015 as cited in Kentikelenis, Stubbs, King, “IMF 
Conditionality”, 564. 
68 Cook, S. and N. Kabeer. “Socio-economic security over the life course: A global review of social 
protection.” (2009). 
69 Chen, Moussié, “IMF, Gender Equality, Labour”, 12. 
70 Elson, Diane, and Ruth Pearson. 1981. “‘Nimble Fingers Make Cheap Workers’: An Analysis of 
Women's Employment in Third World Export Manufacturing.” Feminist Review 7: 87-109. 
71 Mies, Maria. 1982. The lacemakers of Narsapur: Indian housewives produce for the world  
market London: Zed Press.  
72 Razavi, Shahra. “Rethinking Care in a Development Context: An Introduction: Rethinking 
Care in a Development Context: An Introduction.” Development and Change 42, no. 4 (2011): 
873–903. 
 
wage workers the most.73,74 The culmination of these effects leads to a 
phenomenon of “she-austerity”, whereby long-term austerity consequences are 
borne disproportionately by women.75 
 
The additional two foci of deregulation as well as the liberalisation of trade and 
finance are also expected to have negative long-term consequences on both the 
quality and availability of social programmes. Deregulation as a result of IMF 
conditionality has been determined to erode collective and individual labour 
rights,76 resulting in “suppressed wages, unregulated working hours and the lack 
of legal entitlements to social protection”.77 This is particularly prevalent in 
informal work that the majority of women in ‘the Global South’ are already 
employed in.78 It increases the risks women face with life-cycle events, such as 
maternity and aging, and unexpected events, such as health problems.79,80  
 
Trade liberalisation has also had gendered impacts in Latin America. Though an 
increase of export-oriented industry may increase women’s labour opportunities, 
many of these opportunities retain women at the base of the economic hierarchy, 
are considered informal or vulnerable employment, regard women as disposable 
‘reserve labour’, and can create new forms of exploitation in the form of co-opted 
incomes, precarious work, and even violence.81,82,83,84,85 Increased global 
 
73 Rubery “Women and Austerity”, 18-34. 
74 Nettenkoven, Zeynep M., and Izaskun Zuazu. “The Impact of Austerity on Gender in Tertiary  
Education: A Theoretical Analysis,” 2017, para. 2. 
75 The short run impacts of financial crises reflect a “he-session” since male-dominated sectors see 
the most employment losses. Source: Karamessini, Maria, and Jill Rubery, eds. Women and 
Austerity: The Economic Crisis and the Future for Gender Equality. Routledge IAFFE Advances 
in Feminist Economics 11. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2014. 
76 Reinsberg et al. forthcoming as cited in Chen, Moussié, “IMF, Gender Equality, Labour”, 12. 
77 Standing 1999; Balakrishnan et al. 2016; as cited in Ibid., 10. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Srinivas, Smita & Lund, Frances. (2000). Learning from Experience: A Gendered Approach 
to Social Protection for Workers in the Informal Economy, 1-164. 
80 Chen, Moussié, “IMF, Gender Equality, Labour”, 12. 
81 Elson, Pearson, “Nimble Fingers”, 87-109. 
82 Folbre, “Chapter 1”, 15-81. 
83 Zohir, Salma C. and Pratima Paul-Majumder. 1996. “Garment workers in Bangladesh:  
Economic, social and health conditions.” Research monograph (Bangladesh Institute of 
Development Studies), no. 18. 
84 Elson, “Gendered Institutions”, 611-627.  
85 Wright, “Disposable Women”. 
 
competition, another feature of liberalisation and the increase of global value 
chains (GVCs), has exacerbated said issues.86,87 The culmination of these 
consequences adds to the structural constraints faced by women during debt and 
all financial crises and limit the positive mitigation effects that social 
programmes can have. In fact, various feminist scholars have recommended 
increasing public social protection systems and labour regulations.88,89,90,91 
 
Given that gender had not been a prominent focus of IMF policy prescriptions 
and general rhetoric during the era of debt crises, an argument put forth by 
Lang suggests why women’s interests may not have been reflected in conditions. 
He argues that, “to the extent that distributional policies implemented under 
IMF programs reflect the interests of the IMF’s major shareholders and its staff, 
IMF programs constrain the government’s responsiveness to the preferences of 




The above debates motivate the two main hypotheses. The first is that, during 
the era of financial crises in Latin American countries, when conditional lending 
agreements with the IMF became commonplace, social programmes deteriorated 
as a result of austerity, privatisation, and to a lesser extent, deregulation and 
trade liberalisation. The second hypothesis is that social programmes can help 
ease the formal and informal structural burdens on women, especially during 
times of financial crisis. This also suggests that reductions in social programmes 
 
86 Salih and Young 1991 as cited in Elson, “Gendered Institutions”, 611-627. 
87 Wright, “Disposable Women”. 
88 Sen, Purna. 1999. “Enhancing women's choices in responding to domestic violence in Calcutta: 
A comparison of employment and education” The European Journal of Development Research, 11, 
no. 2: 65-86. 
89 Datta, Punita Bhatt, and Robert Gailey. 2012. “Empowering Women through Social 
Entrepreneurship: Case Study of a Women’s Cooperative in India.” Entrepreneurship Theory and 
Practice 36, no. 3 (May): 569–87. 
90 von Broembsen, Marlese, and Martha Chen. "Eliminating Legal Barriers from the Perspective 
of the Informal Economy." Secretariat, UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Women’s 
Economic Empowerment, September 2016. 
91 Chen, Moussié, “IMF, Gender Equality, Labour”, 14. 
92 Lang, “Democratic Deficit”, 600. 
 
would increase the burden of financial crises on women. The hypothesized 
relationship informing this study is illustrated in Figure 1 below. 
 
Figure 1: Hypothesized Pathway 
 
Financial crises → IMF conditionality → Social expenditure → 
Women’s welfare 
 
It is hypothesized, first, that conditions reflective of austerity, liberalization, 
deregulation, and privatization are expected to have had negative effects on 
social spending, a proxy for the strength of social programming (that will be 
described in Research Design). However, as we know, conditions in the areas of 
social policy (primarily for health and education) and poverty reduction were also 
implemented as of the 1990s, though their impact on social spending has been 
debated.93,94 For this reason, conditions in these areas are hypothesized to have a 
non-directional effect on social spending. Similarly, conditions to reform the 
efficiency of administrative institutions may limit fiscal policy space but may 
also increase efficiency in spending; such conditions are also hypothesized to 
have a non-directional impact. The detailed hypotheses regarding the effect of 
conditions in different issue areas on social spending, which will be explained 










93 Gupta, Sanjeev. “Can a Causal Link Be Drawn? A Commentary on ‘the Impact of IMF 
Conditionality on Government Health Expenditure: A Cross-National Analysis of 16 West 
African Nations.’” Social Science & Medicine 181 (2017): 199–201.  
94 Stubbs, Kentikelenis, Stuckler, McKee, King, “IMF and Health Expenditure”, 202-4. 
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The second hypothesis reflects the understanding that welfare retrenchment 
during times of crises can disproportionately effect women in the long run, who 
are particularly hurt by financial crises, and that an increase in social services 
 
and welfare expenditure would ease the burden of formal structural constraints 
that inhibit women’s welfare. Reductions (increases) to social programmes are 
expected to have negatively (positively) impacted various aspects of women’s 
welfare in relation to men. Furthermore, education and health expenditure are 
hypothesized to have significant impacts on education and health outcomes for 
women, respectively. Education (health) spending is unlikely to significantly 
overcome barriers to health (education) services for women. Social services and 
welfare are expected to reduce gender inequality in all measured proxies of 
women’s welfare as they typically afford direct funds to women and ease care 
responsibilities. Hypotheses 2 are displayed in Table 2. The categories of social 




Table 2: Social Expenditure, by Category, and the Hypothesized Impact to 
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4. Research Design  
4.1. Case Selection 
Latin America is the focus of this research for three reasons. Firstly, all 21 
Latin American countries have experienced financial crises of some form, 
most having experienced debt crises in the late 20th and start of the 21st 
centuries. Secondly, the goal of this research is to understand the 
gendered effects of social policies in response to financial crises in low- and 
middle-income countries. Latin American countries have provided social 
protections for the majority of their citizens since the 1970s and have 
reformed them significantly in reaction to their debt crises. Lastly, Latin 
American countries had particularly close involvement with the IMF from 
the 1970s until the early 2000s, though their socioeconomic success was 
also very limited during this period. Together, these reasons make for an 
interesting regional case focus in order to understand how this 
underperformance has been experienced by women and what driving 
factors are behind this phenomenon.  
 
Of the 21 Latin American countries, 19 were chosen for the analysis. They are: 
Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. French Guiana and Suriname were 
excluded for their unique political situations as well as for the lack of data 
available for the characteristics of relevance. Data on IMF conditionality begins 
in 1979 and reliable social expenditure data extends to 2007. This is therefore 





4.2. Operationalization of Theory 
4.2.1 The First Analysis 
Outcome Variables 
To estimate the effect of IMF conditionality on social programmes in Latin 
America and answer Research Question 1, I employ measures of government 
social expenditure as a percentage of GDP as the set of outcome variables to 
proxy changes to the strength of social programming. Government social 
spending as a whole was the first outcome variable of this analysis. The second, 
third, and fourth outcome variables measure government social expenditure 
disaggregated by type: education, health, and social services and welfare. Table 3 
summarizes each category in detail. A disaggregated perspective allows us to 
better understand what social programmes are least or most affected by IMF 
conditions. Figure 2 shows social spending by category over time. 
 
The social spending data is mainly leveraged from a compiled data set created by 
Huber and Stephens,98 which combines multiple archival sources that can be 
traced back to CEPAL and the IMF publications for various years, and has been 
verified through randomized checks of the original sources for its reliability. The 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean’s (ECLAC/CEPAL’s) 
Social Panorama, “Social Expenditure in Latin America: An Update”, and “Base 
de Datos Estadisticas y Indicadores Sociales” data sources were compared for 
consistency against IMF data and were used to fill in gaps where one source was 
missing for a country and year while the other was not. IMF and CEPAL’s Social 
Panorama data were favoured as they are the most widely-used and recent 
sources. When data did not perfectly match between the two, that which was 
most consistent with the others was chosen. 
 
This social spending data is slightly unbalanced as some countries have gaps 
missing for particular years. Though they do not follow an evident pattern, it is 
possible that the data could be missing for reasons that may bias the results. 
This will be addressed further in Research Methods. All of the outcome variables 
 
98 Huber, Evelyne, and John D. Stephens. “Latin American Welfare Dataset, 1960-2014,” 2014. 
 
were led (l+1) to allow time for changes resulting from the explanatory variables 
to take into effect, which better ensures measurability. 
 
A potential limitation to that data is that, during the periods analysed, some 
countries had difficulty collecting and publishing data.99 Though ECLAC and the 
IMF have undertaken efforts to correct and update more recent data (as of 1990), 
archival sources for 1979 to 1989 hold a larger potential risk. Using government 
social spending as a proxy for the strength of social programmes and the welfare 
state in general also has some limitations. Factors such as institutional 
sophistication and the roster of social programmes available can also contribute 
so the strength of social programmes. 
  
 
99 Segura-Ubiergo, “Welfare State in Latin America”, 129-30. 
 
Table 3: Description of Social Expenditure Categories. 
Category of Social Spending Description100 
Education Includes pre-primary, primary, 
secondary, and tertiary educational 
affairs. Expenditures related to the 
administration, management, 
inspection, and operation of pre-
primary, primary, secondary (i.e., high 
school level), and tertiary (i.e., 
university level) educational affairs. 
Healthcare Includes hospital affairs and services 
(i.e., general and specialized hospital 
and services, medical and maternity 
center services, nursing and 
convalescent home services, clinics, 
and paramedical practitioners) and 
public health affairs and services (e.g., 
the administration, management, 
operation, and support of disease-
detection services such as laboratories 
and population-control services). 
Social Services and Welfare Social security includes transfer 
payments, including payments in kind 
to compensate for reduction or loss of 
income or inadequate earning 
capacity; sickness, maternity, or 
temporary disablement benefits; old 
age, disability, or survivor’s pensions; 
pro-poor programs; unemployment 
compensation benefits; family and 
child allowances; and welfare services 


















The main explanatory variables addressing Research Question 1 are the number 
of conditions that apply to a country in a given year from their IMF lending 
agreements, both as a whole and disaggregated into 13 unique issue areas 
developed by Kentikelenis et al.101 The issue areas covered in IMF conditional 
lending programmes are concerned with: external debt; financial sector, 
monetary policy, and Central Bank issues; fiscal issues; the external sector 
(trade and exchange system); revenue and taxes; public and private labour; 
state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform and pricing; SOE privatization; restrictive 
or neutral social policy; redistributive policies; institutional reforms; land and 
environment; and residual issues. Each is described in Table 1 of the Hypotheses 
(section 3).  
 
101 Kentikelenis, Stubbs, King, “Conditionality Data”. 
 
IMF programme agreements are comprised of both binding (hard) and non-
binding (soft) conditions. Prior to 1985 and the Baker Plan, IMF programmes 
consisted of fewer hard conditions. However, hard conditions are those which 
“the IMF places most weight on” and are not easily modified.102 Hard conditions 
are thus more likely to have a more meaningful and significant impact on 
changes to government spending and are therefore what I measure as the main 
independent variables in the first analysis. Adding soft conditions to the analysis 
could contribute to noise in the estimations.103  
 
Data for this variable are available for the years from 1979 through to 2010, 
though the data are unbalanced as there are random gaps for country-year 
observations. The data is taken from an analysis and database of IMF 
conditionality developed by Kentikelenis et al. in an extensive analysis of IMF 
conditionality programmes, ‘IMF Monitor’.104 The data are less likely to be biased 
than the IMFs own monitoring data for their conditional programmes and are 
more comprehensive in the breakdown of issue areas. The number of conditions 
by issue area is represented in Figure 3 and a description of the issue areas can 
be seen in Table 1 of the Hypotheses (section 3). It should be noted that 
environmental conditions were excluded as this variable was highly collinear 
with total and social services and welfare expenditures. 
 
As will be explained below, this government social expenditure data is used 
again in the second main analysis to examine the relationship between changes 
to public social programmes and women’s welfare. In the second analysis, 






102 Kentikelenis, Stubbs, King, “Conditionality Data”. Hard conditions that are not met must be 









The real Gross Domestic Product (rGDP) per capita105 is expected to be positively 
associated with all social spending. It can result in more resources becoming 
available for social programmes. There is, however, a risk of endogeneity bias as 
countries that have stronger human capital (in education and health in 
particular), may also experience greater economic success.106 This data is 
obtained from the Penn World Table 6.3.107 
 
Trade openness was controlled for since, theoretically, it can signal a willingness 
to undertake neoliberal economic policies and can be associated with reduced 
 
105 This figure is adjusted for inflation. 
106 Huber, Evelyne, Thomas Mustillo, and John D. Stephens. “Politics and Social Spending in 
Latin America.” The Journal of Politics 70, no. 2 (2008): 420–36. 
107 Heston, Alan, Robert Summers, and Aten Bettina. “Penn World Tables 6.3,” 2009. 
 
public social spending.108 The measure for trade openness originates from World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) data and annually measures 
imports and exports as a percentage of the GDP.109 
 
FDI has the potential to both create new employment opportunities and new 
forms of precarious labour and exploitation for women. Its hypothesized effect on 
social spending is positive as FDI may be expected to increase the demand for 
human capital, and may also increase demand for social services to counteract 
the potentially negative effects of precarious labour. The measure for FDI is 
obtained from the WDI.110 
 
Several demographic factors were included that increase the demand for social 
services.111 These are: the urban population percentage, the population 65 years 
of age or over, and those 14 years of age or under (of public-school age). These 
variables were also retrieved from the WDI.112  
 
Democracy was controlled for in the first analysis because democratic political 
institutions can offer procedural protections,113,114 accountability to citizens,115 
and a means for citizens to act collectively.116 The Polity V score was used, which 
measures the yearly strength of institutionalized democracy on a scale that 
“ranges from +10 (full democracy) to -10 (full autocracy)” (Marshall and Gurr) 
collected from the Centre for Systemic Peace (CSP).117 
 
 
108 Nelson, Wallace. “IMF Lending and Democracy”, 523–58. 
109 The World Bank Group (WB). “World Development Indicators | DataBank,” 2021. 
110 WB, “WDI”. 
111 Huber, Mustillo, Stephens, “Politics, Social Spending, Latin America”, 420–36. 
112 WB, “WDI”. 
113 Przeworski A. Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense. In Shapiro I, Hacker-Cordon 
C, editors, Democracy's Value. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1999): 23. 
114 Nelson, Wallace. “IMF Lending and Democracy”, 533. 
115 Dahl 1971 as cited in Ibid. 
116 Huber, Mustillo, Stephens, “Politics, Social Spending, Latin America”, 420–36. 
117 Marshall, Monty G, and Ted R Gurr. “Center for Systemic Peace and Societal-Systems 
Research Inc,” 2020, 85 as cited in Centre for Systemic Peace (CSP), and Integrated Network for 
Societal Conflict Research (INSCR). “CSP/INSCR Data Page,” 2020. 
 
To account for the effect of different political ideologies and policy preferences on 
social spending, the left-right dimension of the legislative and executive were 
included. Following Cusack and Fuchs as well as Huber et al.,118,119 legislative 
partisan balance was calculated “by weighting the seat share in a given year of 
each category of parties by -1 for right, - 0.5 for center-right, 0 for center, 0.5 for 
center-left, and 1 for left parties”,120 which also included religiously-associated 
parties, with data from Huber and Stephens.121  
 
A measure of the degree to which countries vote in line with the US in the 
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) was also included in the first 
analysis, as it is possible that countries who share views with the United States 
(US) in the UNGA would be treated to less stringent and potentially fewer 
conditions in their agreements with the IMF.122123 Preferential treatment would 
limit the reduction of fiscal policy space and thus limit changes in social 
spending. The ‘UNGA ideal point’, measures a country’s foreign policy position in 
relation to the US, based on their voting records in each year.124 
 
4.2.2. The Second Analysis 
The second research question is dedicated to understanding how changes in 
government social programmes impact multidimensional aspects of women’s 
well-being and gender inequality in Latin American countries, in the long-run.  
 
Outcome Variables 
Gendered changes to well-being in the dimensions of economic participation, 
education, health, and political participation are measured as the dependent 
 
118 Cusack, Thomas R. and Susanne Fuchs. “Documentation Notes for Parties, Governments,  
and Legislatures Data Set.” Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fuer Sozialforschung, 2002. 
119 Huber, Mustillo, Stephens, “Politics, Social Spending, Latin America”, 420–36. 
120 Ibid., 18. 
121 Huber, Stephens, “Latin American Welfare Dataset”. 
122 Dreher, A., & Jensen, N. M. Independent actor or agent? an empirical analysis of the impact of 
U.S. 
Interests on international monetary fund conditions. Journal of Law and Economics, 50 (2007): 
105–24. 
123 Nelson, Wallace. “IMF Lending and Democracy”, 523–58. 
124 Bailey et al. 2015 as cited in Nelson, Wallace. “IMF Lending and Democracy”, 523–58. 
 
variables in the second analysis. Each dimension is proxied by a chosen 
indicator. Though these four areas represent a relatively broad spectrum of one’s 
measurable welfare, I avoid making the broad generalisation that all aspects of 
women’s well-being are measured.  
 
Economic participation is measured by the number of women employed in 
vulnerable labour as a percentage of all those working in vulnerable 
employment, originating from the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) 
database and obtained from WDI.125  
 
Though the number of women employed or wages earned can be measured, how 
employment is experienced is an important aspect of gender inequality in the 
labour force and is often ignored. For most of the 19 countries being analysed, 
the data is available only from 1990 (as is the case for most employment 
indicators), limiting the period of our analysis to 1990 until 2007.  
 
Educational measures of women’s well-being in relation to men were proxied by 
the proportion of women in tertiary education. This measure of education 
captures the effects on women in working age groups who have had their 
educational attainment disrupted by financial crises where government support 
for education and, to a lesser extent, social services and welfare support, did not 
temper the negative effects.126 This data was obtained from the UNESCO cross-
national database on education.127 
 
The gendered health effects of government expenditure, especially in healthcare 
services, are proxied by examining the ratio of female to male life expectancy at 
birth. Infant mortality is included in the measure and so changes would be 
reflected relatively quickly. This data, from the WDI is also limited to the 20-
year period from 1990 until 2010.128  
 
125 WB, “WDI”. 
126 Blanton et al., “Gendered Consequences”, 941-70. 
127 UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS). “UIS Statistics,” n.d. 
128 WB, “WDI”. 
 
Finally, female participation in politics is proxied by the percentage of positions 
in unicameral parliaments and lower chambers of bicameral parliaments that 
are held by women.129 These data were obtained from the WDI and Inter-
Parliamentary Union (IPU) database for Women in National Parliaments.130,131 
Both datasets were combined to fill in each other’s gaps, but in the rare 
instances where there were conflicts between the data, the IPU data was 
favoured. As expected, some countries had multiple figures in the same year and, 
so, the average was taken for these cases.  
 
Explanatory Variables  
For the second analysis, I look at the impacts that education, healthcare, as well 
as social services and welfare expenditure had on the above measures of women’s 
welfare, first as an aggregate and then individually. The first independent 
variable is total government social spending in these three areas and the 
subsequent three independent variables are government expenditure in 
education, in health, and in social services and welfare. Recall that Table 2 of the 
Hypotheses section (III) describes each of the categories of government social 
spending in detail.   
 
Control Variables 
The rGDP is believed to be relevant to women’s welfare in each of the respective 
categories being studied as it can increase women’s share of consumption and 
improve quality of life. Though FDI is an important control to include, the 
hypothesized effect on women’s welfare is non-directional because gendered 
social structures circumscribe women to particular sectors, or particular jobs 
within various sectors, which tend to offer more precarious roles, even within 
foreign multinational corporations, that can add to vulnerable employment. For 
these reasons, the expected effect of FDI on women’s education, health, political 
participation and vulnerability with regard to labour is non-directional.  
 
129 Blanton et al., “Gendered Consequences”, 941-70. 
130 WB, “WDI”. 
131 Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), Parline. “Historical Data on Women in National 
Parliaments | Parline: The IPU’s Open Data Platform,” 2020 
 
Of the political variables, first democracy was controlled for in the second 
analysis because a strand of democracy scholarship emphasizes that elected 
leaders, who are held accountable by voters, are more likely to take into account 
the needs and wants of female voters in the interest of maintaining office.132 It is 
therefore more likely that women would have more welfare-enhancing policies in 
place where there are strong democracies. The partisan split of the legislative 
was controlled for in the second analysis, though the executive partisan split was 
excluded due to multicollinearity. More left-leaning governments are expected to 
encourage policies regarding women’s welfare outside of familial aspects. The 
second analysis omits the UNGA variable because it lacks a strong theoretical 
connection. Finally, ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) was included as a control 
only for the second analysis. Previous research has pointed to evidence 
suggesting that “countries that have ratified the CEDAW are less likely to 
tolerate systematic socio-economic and political discrimination against 
women”.133,134 Following Blanton et al., this variable is binary, with a 0 value in 
the years prior to ratification (or 0 in all year if no ratification had taken place) 
in place and 1 in the year of and after ratification. 
 
 
5. Research methods 
The two analyses make use of panel data. Firstly, since 19 out of the 21 Latin 
American countries are included, conclusions drawn from the analysis represent 
Latin American countries well. Secondly, the 28-year timeline in the first 
analysis and the 20 to 37-year timeline of the second (depending on the 
particular outcome variable of changes to women’s welfare) allows for the 
analysis to measure lasting effects and allows time for changes from conditions 
and social spending to be reflected. The 1970 start date of the second analysis 
 
132 Blanton et al., “Gendered Consequences”, 941-70. 
133 Cole, Wade M. 2012. “Government Respect for Gendered Rights: The Effect of the 
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on Women’s 
Rights Outcomes, 1981–2004.” International Studies Quarterly 57 (2): 233–249. 
134 Blanton et al., “Gendered Consequences”, 941-70. 
 
takes into consideration any potential trends that existed before IMF (hard) 
conditions could have impacted government social expenditure. Panel data thus 
grants license to both intertemporal and cross-sectional inference and allows for 
more efficient estimates of the effects than do cross-sectional or time-series 
data.135 However, methods with more complications are required since pooled 
ordinary least-squares models alone, commonly employed for cross sectional or 
time series data, would ignore the panel structure of the data.136 The unbalanced 
nature of the data further complicates the necessary treatment; years with 
missing data vary and are unevenly spaced from country to country in various 
dependent and independent variables. Though missing observations appear to be 
random and not patterned, and thus a bias is unlikely, it is possible there are 
reasons for why the data is unbalanced that is not captured, such as limits to 
government capability and resources, or that the variable is of limited concern to 
the state in question, which may be correlated with government expenditures 
and investment in policies that could increase women’s welfare. 
  
5.2. Estimating the Relationship Between IMF Conditionality and Social 
Expenditure 
In considering the effects of IMF conditions on government social spending, it is 
possible that several unobservable factors may impact social expenditure in a 
given year that are not attributable to IMF conditionality. Though theoretically 
viable covariates, that are outlined above, have been included in the analysis, 
failing to account for any unobserved factors risks having them attributing the 
results to IMF conditionality and creating bias.137 Since countries participating 
in IMF programmes are not randomly assigned to treatment and control groups, 
this becomes important to account for. In a comprehensive review of analyses 
that aim to address concerns of endogeneity when studying the impacts of IMF 
conditionality, Stubbs et al. (2018) concluded that instrumental variable (IV) 
 
135 Hsiao, Cheng. “Why Panel Data?” (Working Paper No. 05.33). Institute of Economic Policy 
Research, 2005. 
136 Schmidheiny, Kurt. Short Guides to Microeconometrics. [Course material]. 
137 Stubbs, Kentikelenis, Stuckler, McKee, King, “IMF and Health Expenditure”, 202-4. 
 
estimation was the strongest method and have determined an appropriate 
instrument.  
 
Leveraging Stubbs et al.’s findings,138 I employ IV two-stage least-squares 
(2SLS) regression estimation in the first econometric analysis. The instrument 
chosen leverages a compound instrumentation strategy, as proposed by Stubbs et 
al., in which the instrument is “the interaction of the within-country average of 
the number of conditions across the period of interest with the year-on-year 
IMF’s budget constraint”.139 This dissertation studies the impact of IMF 
conditions in different policy areas, rather than just the presence of participation 
in IMF programmes, so I have modified the approach to meet this dissertation’s 
unique needs and have developed 13 instruments. Figure 3 shows the regression 
equations. 
 
A suitable instrument needs to meet three criteria. It must be: excludable and 
therefore only affect the outcome variable (government expenditure) through the 
instrument, relevant in that it should impact and thus be correlated with the 
treatment variable (IMF conditionality), and lastly the instrument should also be 
independent or ‘as-good-as random’.140 OLS regression analyses, with and 
without relevant controls and robust clustering confirmed the first two 









138 Stubbs, Thomas, Bernhard Reinsberg, Alexander Kentikelenis, and Lawrence King. 
“Electronic Supplementary Material (Data) - How to Evaluate the Effects of IMF Conditionality.” 
The Review of International Organizations, 2018. 
139 Stubbs, Reinsberg, Kentikelenis, King. “Electronic Supplementary Material (Data)”, 45. 
140 Angrist, J. D., & Pischke, J.-S. Mastering 'metrics: The path from cause to effect, 2015. 
 










In total (13 + 1) x 4 = 56 IV 2SLS regressions were run. 14 independent variables 
(13 issue areas and 1 for the total number of conditions) and 4 dependent 
variables (education expenditure, healthcare expenditure, social services and 
welfare expenditure, and the sum of these expenditures). The instruments in the 
estimations whereby the main independent variable in each pertained to the 
number of IMF hard conditions in each of the 13 issue areas are measured by 
“the interaction of the within-country average of the number of conditions [in 
that issue area] across the period of interest with the year-on-year IMF’s budget 
constraint”.141 Each of the IV 2SLS estimations included the same control 
variables. 
 
5.3. Estimating the Relationship Between Social Expenditure and Women’s 
Welfare 
The second main analysis employed fixed-effects (FE) regression modelling. FE 
modelling controls for omitted variables that have time-invariant effects or that 
change very slowly over the period, such as geographical location and natural 
 
141 Stubbs, Reinsberg, Kentikelenis, King. “Electronic Supplementary Material (Data)”, 45. 
 
resource endowment, limiting such bias.142 Also, correlation between unobserved 
time-invariant effects and included explanatory variables is permitted.143 
Additionally, the FE model adjusts for baseline levels of factors that are time-
variant and likely to have significant effects on government expenditures. Many 
such country characteristics have been included as controls, such as the rGDP or 
proportion of senior citizens, however, there are likely to be unobserved 
variables, such as the quality of policy makers and political interest group 
concentrations. Though degrees of freedom are lost, the FE model was chosen as 
most appropriate. 
 
The use of a random-effects (RE) model that produced efficient results with 
slightly smaller standard errors was also considered. RE models estimate 
variable effects that are constant over time but that differ across units, using an 
error term with a time-invariant and unit-specific component.144 However, a 
strong random effects assumption in that no significant random effects that are 
correlated with social expenditure, could not be confidently met and so the 
efficient results would likely be biased. Unobserved variables, such as a country’s 
underlying structure and ability to recover or make loan repayments are likely to 
be correlated with the observed variables. Thus, the FE model was chosen for its 
more reliable results. Hausman specification tests confirmed that the FE model 
was a more appropriate fit over the RE model. 
 
To treat possible unobserved heterogeneity, I make use of Stata 16’s robust 
clustering command that clusters observations by country and builds on the 
Huber-White “sandwich” robust estimator.145,146 The results produced are not 
invalidated by correlations within country clusters. Any departures from normal 
 
142 Williams, R. “Panel Data 4: Fixed Effects vs Random Effects Models. [Handout]” University of 
Notre Dame, Department of Sociology, 2018. 
143 Bell, A., Fairbrother, M., Jones, K. Fixed and random effects models: making an informed 
choice. Qual Quant 53, (2018): 1051–1074. 
144 Bradley, D., Huber, E., Moller, S., Nielsen, F., Stephens, J. Distribution and Redistribution in 
Postindustrial Democracies. World Politics, 55, no. 2, (2003): 193-228. 
145 Ibid. 
146 Mahler, V. A. Economic Globalization, Domestic Politics, and Income Inequality in the 
Developed Countries: A Cross-National Study. Comparative Political Studies, 37, no.9 (2004): 
1025-1053. 
 
patterns of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the panel data will not 
affect the estimates when using robust-cluster estimation.147 
 
The regression equations are represented in Figure 4. 17 regressions (1+ (4 x 4)) 
will examine the effect of social expenditure (total, education, health, social 
services and welfare) on women’s welfare (educational, health, political, and 
labour market welfare), each with the same set of controls. 
 







6. Analysis (results and discussions) 
6.1. Analysis 1  
6.1.1. Analysis 1 Results 
Upon first consideration of the estimates for the effect of the total number of IMF 
conditions on social expenditure in Latin America, both overall and by type 
(displayed in Table 4), one might be led to believe that no relationship exists 
given the lack of statistical significance. It is also possible that the missing 
observations in the data may leave us with too few to be able to draw any 
statistically significant conclusions, though this is unlikely. Alternatively, 
conditions in different issue areas could have had effects that counteracted each 
other in the estimation that were not seen due to my aggregating the conditions 
from each issue are. Recall that the aggregated number of IMF conditions cover 
 
147 As cited in Ibid. 
 
13 different policy areas, each of which have the potential to have varying, and 
possibly counterbalancing, effects on government expenditures. Given this 
possibility and because the results are not in line with the hypothesized 
outcomes, the investigation is taken a step further. Additionally, to gain a better 
understanding of the effects of conditions in vastly different issue areas, the next 
step disaggregates the estimated effects. This is reported in Table 5.  
 
From this disaggregated analysis it becomes evident that the IMF conditions do 
have a statistically significant estimated effect on social expenditure. Fiscal issue 
conditions (mainly concerning fiscal administration – see Table 1) had a 
statistically and substantively significant effect on total social spending by Latin 
American governments; each additional hard condition concerning fiscal issues is 
associated with an estimated average 2.4 percent increase in social spending 
year-over-year. That is to say that, for example, if social spending were 10% in 
2000, it is estimated that an additional fiscal issue condition would increase 
social spending in 2001 to be 10.28% (0.1 + 0.028*0.1 = 0.1028). This 
interpretation carries over for all of the estimations.  Conditions regarding SOE 
reform and pricing, however, had the opposite impact. An additional condition on 
SEO reform and pricing is associated with having decreased government social 
spending by an average of 2.8 percent year-over-year. SOE privatization 
conditions are estimated to have a particularly large positive effect, with each 
additional condition being estimated to increase social spending by an average 
14.4 percent year-over-year. 
 
The analysis continues by further disaggregating the dependent variable of 
social expenditure by category: education, healthcare, and social services and 
welfare since conditions in each issue area are expected to have varying impacts 
on social spending. Conditions concerning fiscal issues, labor issues, and 
redistributive policies, all have positively and statistically significantly impacted 
overall social expenditure in education such that every issue area estimated to 
have an effect on educational spending is found to have positive impacts. 
Healthcare spending is affected differently. Fiscal issue, labour issue, and 
 
institutional reform conditions all had estimated positive effects on healthcare 
spending, whereas conditions in the issue areas of the external sector and 
revenue and taxes are found to have negatively impacted healthcare 
expenditure. The spending category of social services and welfare is impacted in 
a more different manner by changes to IMF conditionality. Conditions 
concerning the external sector, labour issues, and redistributive policies had 
statistically and substantively negative estimated effects on social services and 
welfare spending, though redistributive policy conditions had an especially 
substantial impact with one additional condition being estimated to have 
reduced social services and welfare spending by 12.3 percent, as a year-over-year 
average. 
 
It is important to note that since SOE reform and pricing’s conditions have a 
negative impact on total social spending, whereas no effect is found on each of 
the individual categories of social spending, it is likely that the reason why no 
such impact is found on the individual categories is due to a limit in the number 
of observations per category, which reduces the opportunity for statistical 
significance in the estimations. Had there been more observations to analyse, it 
is likely that one or more of these categories would also be negatively impacted. 
A similar explanation can be made for the effect of SOE privatisation conditions. 
However, the P values as well as theoretical reasoning, that will be discussed 
shortly, suggest that, had there been more data to observe, education and 
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P-values are italicized in the table above.  
*** Indicates coefficients that are significant at the 99% confidence interval. 
** Indicates coefficients that are significant at the 95% confidence interval. 




Table 5: The effects of IMF conditions (disaggregated) on social programmes. 
 
Independent Variables Dependent Variables 
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P-values are italicized in the table above.  
*** Indicates coefficients that are significant at the 99% confidence interval. 
** Indicates coefficients that are significant at the 95% confidence interval. 
* Indicates coefficients that are significant at the 90% confidence interval. 
 
6.1.2. Analysis 1 Discussion 
From the results above, several factors appear to be particularly interesting. The 
first is that, contrary to what was hypothesized, SOE privatisation conditions are 
estimated to have had a relatively large positive effect on social spending in the 
areas of education and health. The most plausible explanation is that the 
privatisation of SOEs either increased demand or was expected to increase 
demand for more competitive human capital. This would entice the government 
to invest in public education and health services to strengthen the attractiveness 
of the workforce. Another possibility is that IMF conditions resulted in 
deleterious educational and health care effects that Latin American governments 
had to mitigate. It is also conceivable that during these periods of crisis, such 
conditions were mostly ignored as the social demand for education and 
healthcare support from the government increased due to the personal cost felt 
by individuals in Latin American countries during periods of crisis. Though not 
the norm, still “a large number of programs are not fully implemented”148 and 
this does not necessarily result in a pause or reduction of funding by the IMF as 
“many governments are granted waivers despite unmet targets”.149 In this way, 
waivers “allow unpunished deviations from IMF conditionality”.150  
 
It is also for this latter reason that conditions regarding external debt issues, the 
financial sector, monetary policy and Central Bank issues, and perhaps most 
surprisingly, restrictive or neutral social policy appear to have had no effect on 
social spending in any area. In contrast, SOE privatization and external sector 
conditions are more likely to have been implemented. This is because another 
prominent international organisation, the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT)/ World Trade Organisation (WTO), was concerned with these 
particular issue areas. More specifically, the GATT/WTO encouraged trade 
liberalisation policies and the reduction of protections and comparative 
 
148 Kentikelenis, Stubbs, King. “Conditionality Data”, 12. 
149 Babb, S. L., and B. G. Carruthers. “Conditionality: Forms, Function, and History.” Annual 
Review of Law and Social Science 4, no.1, (2008):13–29. 
150 Pop-Eleches, G. “Public Goods or Political Pandering: Evidence from IMF Programs in Latin 
America and Eastern Europe.” International Studies Quarterly 53, no.3, (2009):793. 
 
advantages for SOEs in favour of promoting GVCs.151,152 Membership was, and 
still is, largely dependent on agreeing to the reduction of bound tariff rates as 
well as a number of other reforms that limit the possibility for SOEs to grow and 
are intended to make the external sector grow. Latin American countries were 
more likely to implement reforms in areas that were not only of concern to the 
IMF, but also a requirement to be able to gain market access to, and FDI from, 
advanced industrial economies through the GATT/WTO. This reasoning may 
explain why external sector conditions were estimated to reduce government 
health and social services and welfare expenditure, as was hypothesized. 
Furthermore, and more generally conditionality can limit fiscal policy space so 
that governments must pick and choose how to spend limited resources. This, 
coupled with the fact that such conditions are especially a concern of the 
GATT/WTO, could have led to the subsequent social spending.  
 
It is perhaps more understandable that requirements pertaining to fiscal issues 
would result in an increase in social spending, in the areas of education and 
health especially, as will be revisited shortly. The same can be said as for why 
institutional reform conditions were estimated to have had a substantively large 
positive effect on healthcare expenditures by governments. The effects of these 
conditions may have operated through a ‘spending efficiency’ mechanism that 
changed how finances and processes were managed in such a way that could 
have resulted in more funds becoming available for social programmes.153  
 
The areas of education and health have been particularly valued as being key to 
the IMFs pivot toward taking a stance on poverty reduction in low- and middle-
income countries as of the 1990s, with initiatives such as HIPC II and Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers. This reasoning likely applies to the explanation for 
why conditions regarding redistributive policies had such a substantively large 
 
151 Gonzalez, Carmen G. “Institutionalizing Inequality: The WTO Agreement on Agriculture, 
Food Security, and Developing Countries.” Columbia Journal of Economic Law 27, no. 2 (2002): 
433–90. 
152 UNDP. “Making Global Trade Work for People.” Earthscan Publications, London, UK., 2003. 
153 Stubbs, Kentikelenis, Stuckler, McKee, King, “IMF and Health Expenditure”, 202-4. 
 
positive impact on education expenditures. It can also help us understand why 
IMF conditions in various issue areas were determined to have positive effects on 
education and healthcare spending, while having negative effects on social 
services and welfare spending. A glaring example of this is the large positive 
impact on education spending and the large negative impact on social services 
and welfare spending that conditions pertaining to redistributive policies had. 
Social services and welfare are for one, much more difficult to successfully 
implement and manage. There are many different components of this category, 
many of which require a successful welfare state. However, most components of 
Latin American welfare states are still considered emerging.154 In comparison, 
education and health programmes are more mature. This contributes to the idea 
that they would be easier focus areas for states interested in making significant 
improvements in development goals, especially when reductions in fiscal policy 
space limit the choice in how to allocate funds. Additionally, education and 
health are both higher profile programme areas, not only for the IMFs poverty 
reduction strategy, but also for private not-for-profit organisations and other, 
both international and local, interest groups. Monitoring progress in these areas 
(recall Table 2) is also less complicated. If we consider the above explanations to 
be true, it would also have implications for our understanding of why external 
sector conditions had a negative estimated effect on healthcare. This points to 
the possibility that external sector conditions were particularly unfavourable for 
the development of social services in Latin America from 1979 until 2007.  
 
Lastly, I must address why revenue and tax issue conditions were estimated to 
reduce government health expenditure, as was hypothesized. Stubbs et al. 
propose pathways through which IMF conditionality can impact government 
health spending.155 As was observed in studies of West African health systems, 
“budget monitoring and execution systems”, which falls under revenue and tax 
issue conditions, can lead to the decentralization of health services. Though this 
may not seem problematic at first, several West African cases showed evidence of 
 
154 Segura-Ubiergo, “Welfare State in Latin America”, 129-30. 
155 Stubbs, Kentikelenis, Stuckler, McKee, King, “IMF and Health Expenditure”, 202-4. 
 
wide-scale governance and coordination failures that reduced health expenditure 
in the long run.156 
 
6.2. Analysis 2  
6.2.1. Analysis 2 Results 
Recall that the second main analysis estimates the relationships between 
government social spending and multiple dimensions of women’s well-being in 
relation to that of men.  
 
The effects of government social expenditure on each of the proxies of women’s 
welfare are displayed in Table 6. Firstly, in line with the hypotheses, social 
expenditure is estimated to have a positive effect on the percentage of women in 
tertiary education and the percentage of chamber seats held by women. While 
the sign of the estimate for the effect of social expenditure on the number of 
women in vulnerable employment (as a percentage of people in vulnerable 
employment) is in the expected direction (it is negative), there is so statistical 
significance and we therefore cannot draw any conclusions. The sign of the 
estimate for the impact of social expenditure on the female-to-male life 
expectancy ratio, however, contradicts the hypothesis, despite not holding 
significance. To better understand these results, I examine the impact of social 
spending in each category next, displayed in Table 7.  
 
The disaggregated results point to a substantive increase in the percentage of 
women in tertiary education (as a percentage of total enrolment), driven by an 
increase in education expenditure, though no such conclusions can be inferred 
from expenditure in healthcare and social service and welfare. A more conflicting 
story can be inferred from the estimated impacts to the female-to-male life 
expectancy ratio. Though social services and welfare expenditure has had a 
positive impact on this outcome, healthcare expenditure had a very small but 
negative impact. I will address these results in the discussion to follow. Finally, 
the lack of statistical significance, potentially in part due to a limited number of 
 
156 Ibid., 224. 
 
observations, precludes specific insights from being drawn as to the effects that 
education, health, and social services and welfare spending had on the 
percentage of women in chamber and the percentage of vulnerable employment 
held by women.  
 
Though the aggregated results have revealed that social expenditure has 
increased the percentage of women in political chambers, which category or 
categories of social spending that drove the results is uncertain. It is possible 
that each category of social spending is important to the outcome of chamber 
seats held by women, but that no category alone is driving the results.  
 
Table 6: The effects of social programmes (aggregated) on women’s welfare 
 
Independent Variables Dependent Variables 

























































































P-values are italicized in the table above.  
*** Indicates coefficients that are significant at the 99% confidence interval. 
** Indicates coefficients that are significant at the 95% confidence interval. 
* Indicates coefficients that are significant at the 90% confidence interval. 
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P-values are italicized in the table above.  
*** Indicates coefficients that are significant at the 99% confidence interval. 
** Indicates coefficients that are significant at the 95% confidence interval. 
* Indicates coefficients that are significant at the 90% confidence interval. 
 
 
6.2.2. Analysis 2 Discussion 
Perhaps the most surprising result from the second analysis is that government 
healthcare expenditure had a small but negative impact on the female-to-male 
life expectancy ratio. One may presume that this outcome variable takes more 
time than a year to feel the impact of changes to social spending, however, 
 
leading the variable by 2 years and even 5 years only increases the significance 
and size of the estimated effect. A pathway that could explain why health 
spending did not positively impact women in relation to men is that that the 
programmes funded by increases in social expenditure benefited men more than 
they did women. This explanation rests on the idea that social expenditures do 
not necessarily break down the structural barriers that women face, and in 
reality, many women are either excluded from benefiting from social 
programmes, or they cannot benefit from social programmes as much as men 
can.  
 
Also as expected, social services and welfare spending did have a positive impact 
on women’s health in relation to that of men. More so than education or 
healthcare programming, the monetary benefits of social services and welfare 
programmes are felt more directly by women as various benefits are included in 
this category. They can be used to pay for daily needs, such as nutritious food, 
that can have a preventative effect on health. Healthcare investments are more 
likely to be in reactive health services, which can explain the gap between the 
two outcomes. 
 
Several reasons are put forth to explain why education, healthcare, as well as 
social services and welfare spending, did not have a more significant effect on 
decreasing the proportion of women in vulnerable employment. Amsden argues 
that ‘Say’s Law’, in which “supply creates its own demand,” is flawed without 
industrial policy and development.157 Investing into the supply of improved 
human capital, in our case a more educated, healthy, and secure workforce, may 
not have a large positive impact on the demand side of industrial development 
that offers secure paid employment opportunities. We also know that during the 
period of the analysis, partly in response to conditional lending by the IMF and 
partly in response to requirements for GATT/WTO membership, there was an 
increase in privatisation and trade liberalisation, among other reforms. Despite 
 
157 Amsden, Alice H. “Say’s Law, Poverty Persistence, and Employment Neglect.” Journal of 
Human Development and Capabilities 11, no. 1 (2010): 60. 
 
an increase in GVCs and potential paid labour opportunities for women, and 
though their autonomy may have increased in some regards, research from Latin 
America has also shown that women have faced new forms of exploitation, as 
discussed in the Literature Review (section 2), which are more prevalent in 
vulnerable employment. Furthermore, the various structural constraints 
discussed in the Literature Review (section 2) could have limited the mitigation 
effects that increases in social services had on women’s welfare. As such, the 
structural barriers faced by women in accessing social programmes were likely 
not reduced by increased investment by the state. Though social services may 
ease formal burdens on childcare and elderly care responsibilities, they may not 
reduce social and familial pressures for women to assume care responsibilities 
instead of paid employment, which is often less flexible than vulnerable 
employment. Women’s paid employment typically results in lower returns on 
investments than if a male family member were to pursue paid employment 
opportunities instead.  
 
More expectedly, government investment into education did seem to increase the 
proportion of women in tertiary education. In contrast to the limited effect that 
social spending seemed to have on vulnerable employment, education spending 
reduced individual (or familial) investment costs of enrolling a woman in tertiary 
education. Thus, enrolment would have cost less without necessarily having 
replaced their potential role as unpaid caregivers in the same way that paid 




The purpose of this dissertation was to illuminate the relationship between IMF 
conditionality and social programmes in Latin America and develop an 
understanding of how social programmes impact women’s relative welfare. 
Though scholarship regarding the consequences of IMF conditionality is quite 
robust, an understanding of the lasting gendered consequences is more rarely 
considered. This study has aimed to connect the bodies of political economic 
 
research pertaining to the effect of IMF conditions and feminist research 
concerning the impacts of social policy.  
 
In recognizing that IMF conditionality covers a broad range of issue areas, some 
with seemingly contradicting aims, it is important to understand the different 
impacts that conditions in each issue area have had. I leveraged a categorisation 
of issue areas developed by Kentikelenis et al. and IV 2SLS estimation to isolate 
the effects of each type of condition.158 Next, I studied the impact of three 
categories of social programmes on women’s relative welfare using FE modelling. 
My findings concluded that conditionality had mixed impacts on education and 
health programmes, whereas social services and welfare expenditure suffered 
from conditions in all issue-areas, even poverty reduction. However, the 
strengthening (weakening) of social service and welfare programmes, as well as 
education programmes, increase (decrease) relative women’s welfare.  
 
By understanding 1) how the different categories of conditions affect social 
programmes and 2) how social programmes affect women’s well-being, future 
conditional programmes can be reformed in order to better mitigate the negative 
effects that financial crises can have on gender equality. Doing so can have 
instrumental as well as intrinsic value; women’s education, health, political, and 
economic well-being can be transformative for development purposes. The 
intrinsic benefit in reducing inequities, which can in themselves contribute to the 
unfreedoms of women, is perhaps even more motivating.  
  
 
158 Kentikelenis, Stubbs, King, “Conditionality Data”. 
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